Anna
J. Schwartz (1992): Do
Currency Boards Have a Future?, The
Institute of Economic Affairs, Occasional Paper 88 (Twenty-Second
Wincott Memorial Lecture), London.
Looks at the
role of currency boards, especially for stabilising the newly free economies
of Eastern Europe. A skeptical look at the political feasibility of currency
boards, written before most of the recent currency board-like systems were
established |
| A. Walters (1992):
Currency
Boards, Johns Hopkins University,
Department
of Economics, WP
Series, No. 281. |
| Kurt
Schuler (1992): Currency
Boards, Dissertation, George Mason
University, Fairfax, Virginia. |
| Anna
J. Schwartz (1993): "Currency Boards: Their Past, Present, and Possible
Future Role", Carnegie
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 39. |
| Kent Osband & Delano
Villanueva (1993):
"Independent Currency Authorities: An Analytic Primer",
IMF
Staff Papers, 40/1: 202-216. |
| Nissan Liviatan (ed.) (1993):
Proceedings
of a Conference on Currency Substitution and Currency Boards, World
Bank Discussion Paper 207. |
Steve
H. Hanke & Kurt Schuler
(1994):
Currency
Boards for Developing Countries: A Handbook. San Francisco: ICS
Press.
A simple discussion
of the case for currency boards and how to establish them in developing
countries. |
| Adam G. Bennett (1994): Currency
Board Arrangements: Issues and Experiences, IMF
Papers on Policy Analysis and Assesment 94/18. |
Owen
F. Humpage & Jean M. McIntire (1995): An
Introduction to Currency Boards, Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland's Economic
Review, 31/2/: 2-11.
A look at the
pros and cons of currency boards as an institution for providing monetary
credibility in developing countries. |
John
Williamson (1995): What
Role for Currency Boards? Washington: Institute
for International Economics.
To help overcome
its financial crisis, Russia is being urged to create a currency board,
which has met with success in other countries such as Argentina, Estonia,
and Hong Kong. This study explains what a currency board is and how it
differs from a central bank, and examines the advantages and disadvantages
of each type of arrangement. The author concludes that currency boards
may be quite attractive to small, open economies and a useful prop in those
emerging from a very deep macroeconomic crisis, but that their disadvantages
outweigh these attractions in most large countries. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1995): "Paranın
Değeri", Sabah Gazetesi,
25.6.1995. |
| N.
Bülent Gültekin & Kâmil
Yılmaz (1996):
Para
Kurulu: Nedir? Ne Zaman Gerekir?, İstanbul: TESEV,
Yay.
No. 6. |
| Almira
Karasoy (1996):
Para
Kurulu Sisteminin Uygulanması, Ankara: TCMB
Tartışma Tebliğleri. |
| Mutlu
Yıldırım (1996): "Currency Board Sistemi", Başak
Dergisi, 19(89): 28-33. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1996): "Yeni
Lira", Sabah Gazetesi,
1.12.1996. |
| Guillermo E. Perry (ed.)
(1997): Currency
Boards and External Shocks: How Much Pain, How Much Gain?, Washington,
DC: Worldbank. |
Tomás Baliño, Charles Enoch,
Alain Ize, Veerathai Santiprabhob, and Peter Stella (1997): Currency
Board Arrangements: Issues and Experiences, IMF
Occasional Paper 151.
K. Schuller:
"Focuses on recent experience. Has many interesting details, but like other
publications from the IMF, it fails to distinguish between currency boards
and currency board-like systems. Also, it compares the performance of currency
boards and central banks haphazardly rather than systematically." |
| Charles Enoch & Anne-Marie
Gulde (1997):
Making
a Currency Board Operational, IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and
Assessment 97/10. [PDF] |
| The
Economist (1997): "Economics
Focus: The ABC of a Currency Board", 1 November 1997, p.80. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1997): "En
Doğrusu 'Yeni Lira = Avro' ", Sabah
Gazetesi, 28.9.1997. |
| Nouriel
Roubini (1998): The
Case Against Currency Boards: Debunking 10 Myths about the Benefits of
Currency Boards, Stern School of Business, New York University,
February 1998. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1998): Para
Kuruluna Geçelim, Para
Dergisi, 15.2.1998. |
James
Tobin (1998): Financial
Globalization: Can National Currencies Survive?, paper prepared
for the Annual World Bank Conference
on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 20-21, 1998. [PDF]
Fixed exchange
rate, pegs to hard currencies that can be adjusted, are fragile, the more
so the more mobile are capital funds across currencies and national markets.
Once market participants doubt, for whatever reason, the ability of a developing
or emerging economy's central bank to meet its commitment to redeem it
currency in hard currency at the promised rate, they will race to claim
the country's external reserves. Vulnerability to crises becomes greater
as financial markets become less regulated and more internationally open.
To escape currency crises, a country may lock its money to that of a reserve-currency
country, as by a "currency board." This may, if an only if reserves are
ample and all other economic objectives are subordinated, maintain the
peg and hold down inflation. But it sacrifices monetary autonomy and seignorage,
leading in effect and perhaps literally to substitution of the reserve
currency for the local currency as unit of account and means of payment.
When crises hit, the IMF and other lenders give highest priority to restoration
of credibility and confidence in the currency under attack. They require
the victim country to take drastic restrictive monetary and fiscal measures,
whether or not irresponsibility in these policies brought on the crisis.
Since these measures damage the economy, businesses, and banks, they may
not restore confidence. Lenders of last resort are essential and should
concentrate above all on replenishing liquidity. The adjustable-peg system
has outlived its usefulness. For most countries it is better to let exchange
rates float in markets, like those of the big three currencies, dollar,
yen, and deutsche mark (or euro). Even so, unimpeded inflows and outflows
of liquid funds result in unwelcome exchange rate movements. Protection
against them, by taxes or special reserve requirements, are desirable,
and need not curtail useful capital flows. Banks and businesses need to
be prevented from incurring net short term debt positions in hard currency.
Equity and direct fixed capital are the desirable vehicles for developmental
capital movements. |
| Kurt
Schuler (1998): "No
More Central Banks: How to Prevent a Currency Crisis". Journal
of Commerce, May 18, 1999. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1998): Para
Kurulu Spekülatif Saldırıları Engeller, Para
Dergisi, 31.5.1998. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1998): "
'Yeni Lira'nın Kaçınılmaz Gelişi", Para
Dergisi, 28.6.1998. |
| "Dosya:
Para Kurulu Sistemi", Ankara Sanayi
Odası Asomedya
Dergisi, Temmuz 1998. |
Atish R Ghosh, Anne-Marie
Gulde & Holger C. Wolf (1998): Currency
Boards: The Ultimate Fix?, IMF
Working Paper WP/98/8. [PDF]
In recent years,
currency board arrangements have gained increasing popularity. Yet, relatively
little is known about their macroeconomic performance. This paper compares
inflation and output growth in countries with currency boards to countries
with other, less extreme forms of exchange rate peg.
Compared to
other pegged exchange rates, average inflation under currency boards is
about 4 percentage points lower. Some of this may be attributed to the
greater monetary discipline under such arrangements. The bulk of the difference,
however, is explained by the greater confidence engendered by adopting
a currency board. This confidence effect raises money demand, and results
in lower inflation for a given growth rate of the money supply. The findings
are robust to potential endogeneity of the regime choice, whereby countries
with a greater proclivity toward low inflation may be more likely to adopt
a currency board.
On average,
countries with currency boards actually grew faster than countries
with either pegged exchange rates or floating exchange rates. While it
is unlikely that this growth performance can be explained by the exchange
rate regime alone, the opposite proposition.that currency boards lead to
more sluggish growth.receives no support from the data. |
| The
Economist (1998): "By the Board", September 5, 1998. |
Charles
Enoch & Anne-Marie Gulde (1998): Are
Currency Boards a Cure for All Monetary Problems?,
IMF Finance
& Development, December 1998, Volume 35, Number 4.
Currency board
arrangements may be coming back into fashion. What recent successes have
countries had with currency boards and in what circumstances are they most
likely to be effective? |
| Andreas
Freytag (1998): Getting
Fit for the EU: A Currency Board for Poland?, paper presented
at the conference on "The EMU
and the Outside World", KOF/ETH
Zurich, December 11, 1998. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1998): "Para
Kurulu Çözüm Olabilir", Sabah
Gazetesi, 13.12.1998. |
| Jennifer Evetts (199?): "Class
Notes for Currency Boards Project". |
| Anne-Marie
Gulde (1999): The
Role of the Currency Board in Bulgaria's Stabilization, IMF Policy
Discussion Papers PDP/99/3. [PDF] |
| Steve
H. Hanke (1999):
"How
to Make the Dollar Argentina’s Currency". The
Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1999. |
| Ateşan Aybars (1999):
"Para
Birimleri Coğrafyası ve Dolarizasyon", Dünya
Gazetesi, 24.2.1999. |
| Fatih
Özatay (1999):
"Sabitlesek
De Mi Saklasak", Radikal
Gazetesi, 15.3.1999. |
| Fatih
Özatay (1999):
"Doğru
Döviz Kuru Sistemi Var mı?", Radikal
Gazetesi, 17.3.1999. |
Richard W. Koepcke (1999):
Currency
Boards: Once and Future Monetary Regimes?, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston's New
England Economic Review, May-June
99: 21-37. [PDF]
A currency
board can allow a developing economy to establish its domestic currency
relatively promptly and efficiently by fixing the value of its currency
to that of another country and guaranteeing that its currency is backed
by sufficient foreign exchange reserves. Currency boards not only provide
a foundation that encourages traders and investors to accept new currencies,
they also do not require sophisticated money markets and central banking
operations in order to be effective. Because of these attributes, currency
boards have attracted more attention, particularly in the wake of recent
global financial crises, from developing countries in Asia, Latin America,
and Europe that have either introduced new currencies or want to restore
confidence in their currencies. The author reviews the design of currency
boards, the choice of reserve currency and exchange rate, and the role
of a currency board in fiscal and monetary policy. He concludes that while
currency boards can provide a foundation for new currencies, these boards
alone cannot ensure success. Although a board guarantees the backing of
its base money, faith in its currency rests on traders' and investors'
confidence in the economy's financial institutions, capital markets, and
fiscal management. Although a board might cause its economy to import a
reputable monetary policy, it cannot ensure that this policy suits its
economy's needs. Currency boards represent a start, more than a destination,
for the design of monetary authorities, the author concludes. |
Carlos
E. J. M. Zarazaga (1999): "Building
a Case for Currency Boards", Pacific
Economic Review, 4/2:
139-163.
Two common
objections to currency boards are that they are dominated by more flexible
policies and that they are unsustainable. The paper confronts these objections
with the insights from a model economy in which several constituencies
who compete for subsidies do not have the ability to monitor the allocation
of government spending. Such assumptions are meant to capture important
features of the reality of many countries for which currency boards have
been proposed. The model suggests that, in such environments, flexible
policies in a certain class have an inflationary bias that a sustainable
currency board can - but not necessarily - eliminate. |
| Iikka Korhonen (1999):
"Currency
Boards in the Baltic Countries: What Have We Learned?", BOFITDiscussion
PapersNo 6
/ 1999. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1999): "Bulgaristan'da
Para Kurulu", Para Dergisi,
6.6.1999. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1999): "1
Leva = 222.634 TL", Sabah
Gazetesi, 8.7.1999. |
| Aclan Acar (1999):
"Para
Kurulu'na Geçmek Hata Olur", Hürriyet
Gazetesi, 10.7.1999. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (1999): "Para
Kurulu Çözümdür", Sabah Gazetesi,
11.7.1999. |
| Salih Neftçi (1999):
"Bizde
Olur Mu?", Star Gazetesi,
16.7.1999. |
| Deniz
Gökçe (1999): "Yeni
kurban: Arjantin ve Cavallo!", Akşam
Gazetesi, 7.8.1999. |
| Ercan
Kumcu (1999): "Ekonomide
Tuzaklar", Hürriyet Gazetesi,
7.8.1999. |
Anne-Marie
Gulde (1999): The
Role of the Currency Board in Bulgaria's Stabilization, IMF
Finance & Development, September 1999, Volume 36, Number 3.
Bulgaria's
latest stabilization program, which included the introduction of a currency
board, marked the end of a period of economic turmoil and near-hyperinflation.
What accounts for its success? |
| Haydar
Akyazı (1999):
Para
Kurulu ve Türkiye'de Uygulanabilirliği Üzerine Bir Araştırma, İstanbul:
Türkiye
Bankalar Birliği (The Banks Association of Turkey), Yayın No. 214. |
| Hikmet Uluğbay:
"Para
Kurulundan Zorla Vazgeçirdik", Milliyet
Gazetesi, 25.11.1999. |
| Aykut
Kibritçioglu (2000): "2000-2002
Enflasyonla Mücadele ve Yeniden Yapılanma Programının Döviz-Kuruna-Dayalı
Diğer İktisat Politikası Uygulamalarından Farklılıkları", http://dialup.ankara.edu.tr/~kibritci/program.html,
Mayıs 2000. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (2000): "Para
Politikasını Tartışıyoruz", Para
Dergisi, 13.8.2000. |
| Steve
H. Hanke, " The
Disregard for Currency Board Realities," Cato
Journal, 20/1,
Spring/Summer 2000. |
| Deniz
Gökçe (2001): "Hangi
Döviz Kuru Sistemi Uygulanmalı?", Platin
Dergisi, 1.2.2001. |
| İbrahim
Kıbrızlı (2001): "3.
Kriz Reçetesi", Zaman Gazetesi,
24.2.2001. |
| Asaf
Savaş Akat (2001): "Kur
Politikası Tercihleri", Para
Dergisi, 11.3.2001. |
| Altuğ Karamenderes (2001):
"Para
Kurulunun Ucu Göründü", ntv-MS-nbc,
9.4.2001. |
| Deniz
Gökçe (2001): "Bulgaristan'dan
Utanmamız gerek!", Akşam
Gazetesi, 10.4.2001. |
| Faruk
Selçuk (2001): "Para
Kurulu Kaçınılmaz! - - Merkez Bankası’nı Kapatın Gitsin!", ntv-MS-nbc,
10.4.2001. |
| Yarkın
Cebeci (2001): "Para
Kuruluna Karşı Bir Yazı", ntv-MS-nbc,
11.4.2001. |
| Deniz
Gökçe (2001): "Bankacılık-Bulgaristan-Türkiye!",
Akşam
Gazetesi, 11.4.2001. |
| İbrahim
Kıbrızlı (2001): "Arrivederci
Cottarelli...", Zaman Gazetesi,
11.4.2001. |
| Sema
Kalaycıoğlu (2001): "Para
Kurulu - Yeni Bir KİT Mi Olur?", Finansal
Forum Gazetesi, 26.4.2001. |
| Steve
H. Hanke ve Kurt
Schuler (2001):
"Gelişmekte
Olan Ülkeler İçin Para Kurulları ". Ankara: Liberal
Düşünce Topluluğu. |
| Erhan Aslanoğlu (2001): "Para
Kurulu İstikrarı Sağlar mı?", ntv-MS-nbc,
14.7.2001. |
| Nejla Adanur Aklan (2001):
Para
Kurulu Fiyat İstikrarının Sağlanmasında Alternatif Bir Kurum Olabilir mi?,
Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi
İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt:
19, Sayı: 4, Aralık. |
| Haydar
Akyazı (2002):
Alternatif
Parasal Rejimlerde Fiyat İstikrarı: Enflasyon Hedeflemesi ve Para Kurulu
Örnekleri, İktisat, İşletme
ve Finans Dergisi, Ankara: , Ocak 2002, Yıl 17, Sayı 190. |
Aziz Kutlar and Salih Barışık
(2002):
An Econometric
Inquiry About the Feasibility of a Currency Board System in Turkey,
Russian
and East European Finance and Trade, January-February,
38/1: 87-101.  |
Introductions
by:
/ Kurt Schuler
/ John Williamson
/ Michael Devereux
/
